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Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink, Jiang Zemin and China 5 New Elite 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre the 
transition from the second to the third generation of Chinese Communist Party 
leadership acquired a specific form: an increasingly frail, diminutive Deng 
Xiaoping brought a bespectacled, rotund Jiang Zemin into the political 
limelight. Deng Xiaoping supported, protected, and cultivated the political 
future of Jiang Zemin, ensuring Jiang's methodical rise through the ranks. By 
1994, Jiang had assumed the titles of State President, Party General Secretary, 
Chairman of the Central Military Commission, Core Leader, and Chief 
Engineer. Bruce Gilley's Tiger on the Brink traces Jiang's career and 
demonstrates that, while not inevitable, Jiang's ascendancy to the centre of the 
post-1989 Chinese leadership was based on years of active participation in 
high-level Chinese politics, most notably as mayor of Shanghai. Gilley 
furnishes a much-needed outline of Jiang's political involvement from the 
1940s through 1998 and provides the reader with insight into both elite 
factional politics in post-Mao China and the personality of China's leader. 
An emphasis on the relative positioning of Jiang Zemin vis-A-vis existing 
and emerging factions within the Chinese leadership leads Gilley to conclude 
that Jiang's success derived, perhaps counter-intuitively, from a weak personal 
power base. Jiang perfected the art of consensus politics and currying favour 
with influential persons; he never enjoyed the unquestioned support of one 
faction in particular. Gilley's provocative argument stems from thorough 
research of factional alignments at various historical moments relevant to 
Jiang's political career. Gilley's overwhelming concern with who forged 
alliances with whom, however, comes at the expense of careful analysis of 
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policy formulation, ideological debates, and the crisis of Marxism that 
followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international reaction to the 
Tiananmen Square massacre, and China's increasing integration into a neo- 
liberal global economy. Gilley's telling of the story of Jiang's rise primarily as 
a one of political maneuvering reveals unquestioned acceptance of two framing 
discourses - one, continuity of an emperor-centred (and presumably irrational) 
politica1 system in China despite a century of revolutions an4 two, a teleology 
of development that privileges neo-liberal economics. The accompanying 
assumptions about history and politics, China and "the West" preclude a 
critical account of Jiang's political career and open the text to criticism for 
superficial historicism and an untheorized dismissal of Marxism as irrelevant 
to China at the end of the twentieth century. 
Uncritical use of terminology equating Jiang Zemin, Deng Xiaoping, and 
Mao Zedong with emperors of Confucian China surfaces throughout and is 
reflected in chapter titles such as "Independent Kingdom" and "The Emperor's 
Mandate." Gilley ignores debates among China scholars about the relevance of 
such categories in twentieth century China in favour of a facile presentation of 
Chinese politics as Byzantine. He invokes spatial and temporal tropes that 
portray the consensus politics practiced by Jiang Zemin as a product of a time 
and place other than "the modem West." Allusions to ancient historical myths 
often act as explanation of the cultural milieu out of which Jiang emerged and 
the political culture in which he participates. Even when Gilley refers to 
twentieth century historical events or figures, his references tend to obscure 
more than they clarify. The comparison of Jiang's nationalist sentiments with 
those of one of the preeminent writers and social critics of modern China, Lu 
Xun, is unconvincing unless we impose a banal definition of modern Chinese 
nationalism on both: "China was China and the United States was the United 
States, Jiang believed, and the two would forever be at odds" (2 10). 
Loose historical references and the extended metaphor of Jiang as 
emperor allow Gilley continuously to explain the apparent contradiction 
between economic liberalism and political conservatism in Jiang's thought as 
a tension within Jiang's personality. This tension, Gilley asserts, arises out of 
Jiang's imperial pretensions and his "modernist" impulses; the former 
associated with China, the latter with scientific knowledge and economic 
development. At times, Gilley seems to be suggesting that Jiang is moving 
China away from particularism toward universalism. Gilley states: "Jiang also 
had a worldliness that distinguished him from Mao and Deng. He could 
discuss the aperture between the circuits in a semiconductor with one 
researcher and chaos theory and its possible applications to history with 
another. ... And within months of its appearance, Jiang was even quoting from 
the American professor Samuel Huntington's influential book The Clash of 
Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order" (229-230). I hope I am not 
alone in expressing concern that knowledge of circuits and Huntington's 
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analysis of world order suffice as "worldliness" over a continual, albeit 
troubled, engagement since the 1920s by Chinese Communist Party leadership 
with issues of social justice, egalitarianism, imperialism, and women's 
emancipation. 
Tiger on the Brink leaves us with the impression that Marxism for the 
Chinese Communist Party is void of commitment to socialist goals and simply 
has become synonymous with Party control and repression. While this holds a 
great deal of truth for the fate of Marxist-Leninist-Mao Zedong Thought in late 
twentieth century China, more attention needs to be given to how Marxism was 
transformed by various leaders, including Jiang Zemin, into a legitimating 
backdrop for "developmental dictatorship." Gilley does not delve sufficiently 
into the content and implications of policies and campaigns to shed light on 
this transformation. The decision in October 1996, for example, to allow 
partial divestment of state-owned enterprises to improve performance 
redefined shareholding as "public ownership" as long as the state held a 
controlling share. This, Gilley notes, preserved the myth of China as a socialist 
state even as state enterprises were being dismantled. Such a redefinition, 
however, begs several questions: one, how and when did socialism assume the 
narrow definition of ownership of means of production?; two, how, when, and 
why did economic efficiency replace social justice in the official discourse as 
the standard of evaluation?; three, what was Jiang's role in these changes?; and, 
fourth, what are the implications for social justice in China of such 
redefinitions? Tiger on the Brink fails to address these questions. As a result, it 
judges lightly Jiang's developmental dictatorship. 
Gilley sums up the biography by stating "As an individual, Jiang is 
arrogant, but at the same time self-effacing. He has committed minor sins, but 
he is not a man to hate" (332). Are we to understand, then, that dictatorship - 
which has included strident control of the media and a willingness to use force 
against dissidents - is only a minor sin when coupled with neo-liberal 
development? Gilley suggests as much as he maintains an opposition 
throughout the biography between scientific rationality and Maoism. Jiang's 
hard-liner tendencies are attributed to tactics of political survival necessary in 
Mao's China (43) and his paternalism ostensibly has roots in a traditional 
upbringing (104). But, both are "offset" by his desire for stability and 
economic reform; in Gilley's words, "Like Mao, Jiang was obsessed with 
political control; ... Unlike Mao, however, Jiang's allegiance to Marxism was 
in doubt, and he did not harbor radical social ideas, he was a social 
conservative" (286). 
Gilley tends to separate Jiang Zemin, the economic reformer from Jiang, 
the political conservative. Even as he provides detailed discussion of Jiang's 
role in repressing student demonstrations in 1986 and 1989, Gilley speaks of 
Jiang "as a leader who ushered in a truly modem Chinese state" (241). The 
discursive frameworks within which Gilley embeds the story of Jiang's rise to 
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power allow Gilley grudgingly to accept Jiang's undemocratic political 
practices on the promise of economic reform. This acceptance is the cost 
accrued by locating Jiang Zemin within a development trajectory that denies 
socialist China anything but an aberrant role. While Tiger on the Brink offers 
a detailed narrative of Jiang's political career, a more critically engaged 
analysis of Chinese politics and Jiang Zemin demands critique of the cult of 
developmentalism - not to embrace the cult of Mao but to explain further the 
intimate links between developmentalism and Jiang's success in China and 
internationally. 
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Gerald Friedrnan, State-Making and Labor Movements: France and the 
United States, 1876-1914 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
The value of comparative history and the rationale underlying it, writes 
historian Colleen Dunlavy, is its "ability to expose otherwise invisible 
paradigms that become second-nature in the historiography of every nation."' 
However, in using the comparative method Gerald Friedman is less concerned 
with illuminating lacunae in nationally-oriented history than in criticizing 
history written from an Orthodox Marxist ("OM," in his shorthand) 
perspective. In State-Making and Labor Movements, Friedman argues that 
labour historians, trapped by their Marxist orientation, have failed to explain 
either the United States' "exceptionally" conservative labour movement and 
absence of significant socialist movements or European, that is, French, labour 
radicalism. 
The problem lies in labour history's focus on the agency of working 
people to the exclusion of the views and actions of other classes - especially 
those classes that stood as allies to labour or possessed the power to restrain 
labour's choices and fields of action. In Friedman's view, the constraints 
working people have faced and the help they have received from allies is more 
important to successhl labour movements than labour activism itself. To the 
not-so-new labour historians this may be heresy, but Friedman steadfastly 
insists that in a world of unequal power relations, labour needed (and 
presumably still needs) allies among sympathetic members of the bourgeoisie 
and state elite to succeed. Drawing upon the social movement theory of Sidney 
Tarrow, Friedman argues that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries organized labour sought alliances and grew more radical to press 
opportunities when state politics was friendly and retreated into conservative 
postures in self-defense when employers counterattacked. These "cycles of 
contention" form the substance of Friedman's comparison between France and 
